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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Leland A. Martineau appeals a final judgment 
entered against him for a written debt. The Honorable Scott 
Daniels in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
heard the case and entered his decision. Original jurisdiction 
for this appeal is in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989) because the Court of 
Appeals has no original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989). The Court of Appeals now 
has jurisdiction pursuant to the July 17, 1989 transfer of this 
case by the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a breach of contract action which resulted in a 
stipulated judgment at trial. Defendant Martineau sought relief 
from the judgment because Plaintiffs Strand/MLK assigned their 
claim, but this motion was denied. The terms of the stipulated 
judgment were breached, and the trial court amended its judgment 
to offer Strand/MLK a remedy. Martineau asserted offsets to 
Strand/MLK's judgment, but he had no standing to assert them and 
they were dismissed by summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying 
Defendant Martineau1s motion to set aside the Order and Judgment 
by ruling that Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure had 
not been violated by the Strand/MLK's assignment of the second 
mortgage to Nupetco, when the court substituted Nupetco as 
Plaintiff. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by amending 
the personal judgment against Martineau to remove the requirement 
that Plaintiffs first foreclose on the Idaho property where 
Martineau breached his stipulation and by his actions prevented 
Plaintiffs' assignee from proceeding as stipulated. 
3. Whether the trial court made the proper legal judgment in 
granting summary judgment for Strand/MLK when there were no 
disputed facts and when Martineau had no standing to assert 
offsets to reduce Strand/MLK's judgment. 
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4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
substituting Nupetco as a party after Strand/MLK assigned Nupetco 
their cause of action, judgment, and mortgage. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17(a). 
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 
. . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in 
interest. 
2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 25(c). 
(c) Transfer of Interest. In the case of any transfer 
of interest, the action may be continued by or against 
the original party, unless the court upon motion directs 
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be 
substituted in the action or joined with the original 
party. . . . 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13(j). 
(j) Claims Against Assignee. Except as otherwise 
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and 
assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been 
asserted against an assignor at the time of or before 
notice of such assignment, may be asserted against his 
assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, 
or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim 
of the assignee. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-21 and 48-1-22. 
48-1-21• Extent of property rights of a partner. 
The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights 
in specific partnership property, (2) his interest in 
the partnership and (3) his right to participate in the 
management. 
48-1-22. Nature of a partner's right in specific 
partnership property. 
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners of 
specific partnership property holding as a tenant in 
partnership. 
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5. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37. 
48-1-37. Rules for distribution. 
(1) The assets of a partnership are: 
(a) The partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the 
partners necessary for the payment 
of all the liabilities specified in 
subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall 
rank in order of payment, as follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other 
than partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other 
than for capital and profits. 
(c) Those to owing to partners in 
respect of capital. 
(d) Those owing to partners in 
respect of profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order 
of their declaration in subsection (1) of this 
section to the satisfaction of the 
liabilities. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs Strand/MLK brought this action to enforce a loan 
to Defendant Martineau evidenced by a second mortgage secured by 
Idaho property. During the trial the parties stipulated that the 
mortgage was valid, that defenses to the validity of the mortgage 
were waived, that judgment be entered against Martineau, and that 
the Idaho property be foreclosed prior to pursuing Martineau for 
any deficiency, Martineau moved for relief from the judgment 
because Strand/MLK had assigned the second mortgage to Nupetco. 
The court denied this motion. Martineau raised defenses in the 
Idaho foreclosure action and caused the property to be placed in 
bankruptcy, despite Martineau1s waiver of defenses. Because 
Martineau violated the terms of the stipulation, the trial court 
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amended its judgment to allow Strand/MLK to pursue the judgment 
against Martineau without proceeding further on the Idaho 
foreclosure. Martineau asserted his offsets and counterclaim, but 
the court ruled them inapplicable to Plaintiffs claim because 
Martineau had no standing to assert them. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings 
The complaint was filed on August 2, 1983 (R. 2). Defendant 
Martineau answered and counterclaimed on August 19, 1983 (R. 5). 
Strand/MLK answered the counterclaim on September 30, 1983 (R. 9). 
Discovery was undertaken and the trial began September 3, 1985 (R. 
41). During trial, the parties entered into a stipulation for 
judgment against Martineau, that the second mortgage on Idaho 
property was valid, that Martineau1s defenses to the mortgage were 
waived, and that the Idaho property would be foreclosed before 
action was taken against Martineau on a deficiency (R. 50). 
Strand assigned the Order and Judgment to Nupetco on October 18, 
1985 (R. 490). Strand/MLK's assignee, Nupetco, brought an action 
in Idaho to foreclose on the second mortgage on December 3, 1985 
(R. 67-71). Although Martineau had waived his defenses to the 
validity of the mortgage, defenses were raised in the Idaho 
action. The Idaho court rejected the defenses June 27, 1986 (R. 
99-107). Shortly after the Idaho ruling and ten months after the 
entry of the judgment, on July 8, 1986, Martineau filed a motion 
for relief from the judgment claiming that Strand/MLK were not the 
real party in interest and that Martineau had been prejudiced 
because of the assignment (R. 54). The Motion for Relief from the 
Judgment was denied on October 29, 1986 (R. 128). On November 24, 
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1986, Nupetco tiled an Appearance of Counsel (R. 125). Martineau 
filed a Notice of Appeal from the November 10, 1986 Order dated 
December 9, 1^8b, (R. 12.6) and on the same day, Martineau's 
counsel withdrew from representation (R. 132). The appeal was 
dismissed on October 2, 1987 (R. 302). On March 26, 1987, 
Martineau, as the general partner of Magic Valley Properties, 
caused Magic Valley Properties to file a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Petition to stay the foreclosure action in the State of Idaho (R. 
524). 
The assertion of defenses in the Idaho foreclosure (R. 99-
107) and placing the property into bankruptcy (R. 524), were 
violations of the Order and Judgment of October 11, 1935# Nupetco 
filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment to relieve Nupetco of the 
obligation to foreclose the Idaho property prior to seeking 
satisfaction of the judgment from Martineau (R. 305). Martineau 
replied to Nupetco's motion and after hearing, Nupetcofs motion to 
amend the judgment was granted (R. 338). Martineau filed a Motion 
to Reconsider the Motion to Amend Judgment (R. 345), but said 
motions were denied (R. 391). At the hearing on Martineau's 
Motion to Reconsider, the Court ordered that Martineau submit an 
affidavit setting forth the offsets alleged by Martineau against 
Strand/MLK (R. 391). On December 14, 1987, Martineau submitted 
his Affidavit of Claimed Offsets to the Court for adjudication (R. 
420). The Affidavit and subsequent discovery disclosed that 
Martineau's offsets had been assigned to the Hammons-Martineau 
Partnership. The tri*l concerning these offsets wis scheduled for 
January 19, 1988 before Judge Moffat, because of a trade in the 
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docket with Judge Daniels. At the time scheduled for trial, the 
Court continued the trial in light of Nupetco's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 697) and the parties entered into a stipulation 
precluding the assignment or change in the interests or identities 
of the parties and assignees (R. 697). On January 29, 1988, 
Nupetco filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 453). 
Martineau responded on February 8, 1988 (R. 507) and Strand/MLK 
filed a Response Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 12, 1988 (R. 544). The matter was set for 
hearing and heard on April 1, 1988 (R. 558). On August 23, 1988 
the court granted Strand/MLK1s motion for summary judgment (R. 
561). In response to the Summary Judgement, Martineau filed a 
Motion for Relief from Judgment on September 23, 1988 (R. 565). 
This Motion was denied on October 7, 1988 (R. 576). On October 
14, 1988, Martineau filed a Motion for Stay of Execution of 
Judgment Pending Appeal or in the Alternative for Approval of 
Assignment of Judgment of Supersedeas Bond (R. 577). On October 
21, 1988, the Court ruled that the Motion for Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal was granted. At the same hearing, the Court 
granted the motion to substitute Nupetco as the party plaintiff 
and to enter judgment in favor of Nupetco (R. 596). Martineau 
filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment and other motions relating to 
this proceeding, which were all denied (R. 652). The Order 
Substituting the Parties and naming Nupetco as Plaintiff was 
executed April 26, 1989 (R. 663). The Amended Summary Judgment 
against Leland Martineau was also entered April 26, 1989 (R. 666). 
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Notice of Appeal on this action was filed on May 25, 1989 (R. 
667). 
C. Statement of the Facts 
Because Defendant misstates important facts and fails to 
include important facts in his fact statement, Nupetco finds it 
necessary to set forth its own statement of the facts. 
Michael W. Strand and MLK Investments (hereinafter 
"Plaintiffs" or "Strand/MLK") filed their Complaint on August 2, 
1983 listing three causes of action: breach of contract for the 
repayment of a loan to Martineau in the amount of $427, 939.25, 
unjust enrichment, and conversion of said sum. (R. 2-4) The 
contract was evidenced by a second mortgage on Idaho property (R. 
64), but Strand/MLK did not seek to foreclose the mortgage 
because no note embodying the underlying obligation on the 
mortgage existed, and a previous foreclosure action in Idaho was 
dismissed (R. 162). Prior to the dismissal of the Idaho 
foreclosure action, Strand/MLK assigned the mortgage to Nupetco 
Associates (hereinafter "Nupetco") on April 27, 1983 (R. 66). The 
underlying obligation had not been assigned by Plaintiffs, but was 
later assigned on August 12, 1985 (R. 489). 
At trial, Strand/MLK intended to utilize the mortgage 
document as evidence of Martineau's indebtedness (R. 162-164). 
The Complaint named several Defendants, but only Defendant Leland 
A. Martineau (hereinafter "Defendant" "Martineau"), the 
Appellant herein, responded to the action. Martineau filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim asserting claims for accounting, audit, 
and financial services performed by Martineau and Co. (R. 5-8). 
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On August 12, 1985, Strand/MLK assigned all of their right, title 
and interest in this cause of action to Nupetco (R. 489). 
The trial began September 3, 1985, and after the morning 
session, Martineau argued a motion to dismiss Strand/MLK' s 
complaint on the basis of the one action rule, claiming that 
Strand/MLK failed to exhaust the security before initiating this 
action. In response to that motion Strand/MLK1s attorney, Mr. 
Caine, stated: 
. . . [Plaintiffs] did, in fact, initiate a lawsuit to 
foreclose the second mortgage in the State of Idaho 
prior to this suit being initiated here. That suit was 
dismissed based upon, really, a stipulation of all the 
parties wherein it was determined that under Idaho law, 
the second mortgage in fact really isn't a mortgage 
because there is no underlying note and could not be 
foreclosed. 
The Court obviously understands that to foreclose-
-so that the Court is clear, the property we're talking 
about foreclosing is in Burley, Cassia County, Idaho. 
So foreclosure against real property couldn't lie here. 
It would have to go as an action in rem. 
So they tried to do that. The case was dismissed 
up there on the basis in effect that all the parties 
recognize that under Idaho law, this mortgage was 
defective because there's no underlying note. Also, it 
may very well be defective on its face. Under our law 
or any other law when you have a comment saying, "This 
is to secure indebtedness between the parties in varying 
amounts in excess of $200,000.00." It's not clear to me 
whether that is a sum certain and can obviously be 
attacked in our own jurisdiction. 
So there's some question to validity of this 
mortgage to begin with. And I submit we have not plead 
either the validity or invalidity of this document as a 
mortgage in this case, but very simply produced this as 
a piece of evidence indicating, if you will, as an 
admission against interest, against Mr. Martineau, that 
the debt we're talking about here is a loan. . . . 
that's part of the case demonstrating a loan. 
Under that extent, this is not being treated as a 
mortgage per se, but is evidence indicating an admission 
against the interest . . . 
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(R. 162-164) As Mr. Caine continued his argument, Martineau 
entered into a stipulation with Strand/MLK to allow Strand/MLK to 
foreclose on the Idaho property before any further action was 
taken in this case. 
Mr. Caine: Secondly, I think in the situation we 
have in this case that there was an attempt to foreclose 
on the mortgage, and if—if counsel for Mr. Martineau is 
now saying in this proceeding and are willing to 
stipulate that, in fact, there is a $327,000.00 debt, 
that's evidence—even though it's not a promissory note, 
there is a debt that is secured by that note—or secured 
by that mortgage, excuse me, and willing to stipulate to 
that, that's fine. We'll stop right now and go up to 
Idaho. 
Mr. Kipp: We accept it. 
The Court: All right. That settles the case. 
Mr. Caine: You stipulate that that is secured by 
the property. 
Mr. Kipp: We accept it. We accept that proffer. 
The Court: All right. Well, that's what we will 
do then. 
Mr. Caine: All right. 
The Court: We'll stipulate there's a $327,000.00 
debt secured by the second mortgage. 
(R. 16 5-166) Martineau stipulated that the second mortgage was 
valid and waived his defenses to that mortgage. The stipulation 
was embodied in the Order and Judgment signed by Judge Daniels 
dated October 11, 1985 (R. 50-51). The Order and Judgment entered 
a personal judgment against Martineau, ordered and established the 
second mortgage on the Idaho property valid, ordered that all 
Martineau's defenses against the second mortgage were waived, and 
required Plaintiffs to foreclose the Idaho property before seeking 
the personal assets of Martineau to satisfy a deficiency (R. 50-
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51). The Order and Judgment was also assigned to Nupetco on 
October 18, 1985 (R. 490). Nupetco ratified and affirmed the 
stipulation by filing an action to foreclose the mortgage in the 
Idaho Courts on December 3, 1985 (R. 67-71). 
In the Idaho action, Martineau raised numerous defenses in an 
attempt to defeat Judge Daniels1 October 11, 1985 Order and 
Judgment. Martineau argued that the foreign judgment was void 
because Nupetco lacked capacity and standing, the Idaho court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the statute of limitations for 
enforcing the mortgage had run, the claim was not being prosecuted 
by the real party in interest, and Nupetco had failed to obtain 
jurisdiction over all named defendants. (R. 99-107, 306) These 
defenses were all rejected by the Idaho courts. (R. 99-107). 
Shortly after the ruling in the Idaho courts, on July 10, 
1986, approximately ten months after the Order and Judgment was 
executed by Judge Daniels, and eight months after Nupetco filed 
its action to foreclose the second mortgage in Idaho, Martineau 
filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment arguing that the 
action had not been pursued by the real party in interest and the 
assignment of the second mortgage to Nupetco prejudiced Martineau 
and Martineau was not able to assert all his possible defenses at 
trial (R. 58-63). This motion was denied on October 29, 1986 (R. 
118, 120). 
Martineau violated the terms of the Order and Judgment 
entered on October 11, 1985 by filing and arguing the Motion for 
Relief from Order and Judgment, by arguing in the Idaho courts 
that the foreign judgment was void because Nupetco lacked capacity 
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and standing, that the Utah court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, that the statute of limitations for enforcing the 
mortgage had run, that the claim was not being prosecuted by the 
real party in interest, that Nupetco had failed to obtain 
jurisdiction over all named defendants (R. 99-107, 306), and by 
filing bankruptcy on the Idaho property (R. 524). More than two 
years after the entry of the Order and Judgment, after Martineau 
had thwarted all attempts of Nupetco to foreclose on the Idaho 
property and fulfil the terms of the stipulation, Nupetco filed a 
Motion to Amend the Judgment to relieve Nupetco of the obligation 
to foreclose the Idaho property prior to pursuing Martineau on the 
judgment (R. 305). After hearing, Nupetco's motion to amend the 
judgment was granted (R. 338). 
Subsequently, the Court ordered Martineau to submit an 
affidavit setting forth the offsets he sought to assert against 
the judgment (R. 391). On December 14, 1987, Martineau submitted 
his Affidavit of Claimed Offsets seeking recovery for accounting 
services performed for Strand and Strand related entities, 
accounting services performed for Magic Valley Properties, and to 
satisfy a personal judgment against Strand in favor of David 
Hammons (R. 420). The Affidavit and subsequent discovery 
disclosed that Martineau's offsets had been assigned to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership (R. 420, 430). The trial concerning 
these offsets was scheduled for January 19, 1988 before Judge 
Moffat, because of a trade in the docket with Judge Daniels. 
Judge Moffat continued the trial because of Nupetco's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment (R. 697) and the parties entered into a 
stipulation: 
The Court: You have a stipulation, I think, 
regarding the status and posture, the citus [sic], if 
you would, of the current claims and counterclaims. Do 
you want to put that in the record—somebody? 
Mr. Petty: If I can articulate that perhaps. The 
parties stipulate that Strand's assignee, Nupetco, and 
Martineau's assignee, the party known as the Hammons 
Partnership, agree, that from this point from today's 
date until the time of trial and through trial, that the 
respective interests of these assignees and parties will 
not change —there will be no assignments of claims or 
interests from the assignees in any way and— 
The Court: As they relate to this action. 
Mr. Petty: As they relate to this action. 
Mr. Green: That's stipulating my stipulation. 
Mr. Caine: That's my understanding of the 
agreement. 
The Court: To put it another way: You're saying 
the claims and counterclaims that are as of now held by 
Nupetco on the one hand and the Hammons-Martineau 
Partnership on the other hand, will not be assigned or 
transferred or in any way altered. Those claims will 
remain static and identical from now down through trial. 
Mr. Caine: That's correct. 
The C o u r t : I a s s u m e t h e y ' l l n o t t a k e any 
a d d i t i o n a l c l a i m s o r d e f e n s e s or a s s i g n m e n t s from 
anybody e l s e e i t h e r . 
Mr. Petty: Not to be utilized. 
Mr. Caine: Not in this action. 
Mr. Green: So stipulate. 
(R. 6 97) The summary judgment arguments were fully briefed and 
heard, and on August 23, 1988 the Court granted Strand/MLK motion 
for summary judgment (R. 561) stating: 
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. . . because Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his 
interest in the alleged claims and offsets asserted in 
this action to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is 
unable to assert said claims and offsets against the 
personal judgment entered against him, and the Court 
therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Nupetco 
Associates. 
(R. 665). Subsequently, Nupetco was substituted as Plaintiff on 
April 26, 1989 (R. 663). 
D. Disputed Facts 
Defendant Martineau repeatedly asserts that he was prejudiced 
and unable to assert his offsets and counterclaims against 
Strand/MLK and Nupetco because he was unaware of the assignment of 
the second mortgage from Strand/MLK to Nupetco (Appellants brief, 
p. 9, 24,). Martineau's offsets were presented to the court by 
Affidavit (R. 420). Any offsets or claims Martineau had against 
Strand/MLK or Nupetco could have been asserted at that time. 
Martineau was never precluded from asserting his offsets and 
claims as a result of the assignment of the second mortgage. 
Martineau asserts that Nupetco's attorney, Ralph Petty, undertook 
to file motions on behalf of Strand and MLK (Appellants brief, p. 
11, 13,). Mr. Petty has always represented Nupetco and has not 
represented Strand or MLK, who at all times had independent 
counsel, John Caine. 
Martineau states that he was precluded from joining the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership as a party to this action by Judge 
Moffat and ordered not to make any transfers or disposition of the 
partnership interest and offsets (Appellants Brief, p. 15, 32). 
However, Martineau entered into a stipulation that the interests 
and parties remain unchanged until the time of trial (R. 697, 
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p.4). Judge Moffat made no order concerning the parties or their 
interests, and any preclusion of Martineau was based upon his own 
stipulation. 
Martineau asserts that he " . . . represented to the court 
that, with leave of court to do so, he could obtain written 
ratification of his personal use of these offsets, assignment of 
them back to him in his individual capacity or the joinder or 
substitution of the partnership as defendant." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 34). However, there is no reference to the record to 
substantiate this claim. In fact, Martineau was precluded from 
taking any steps to change the parties or their interests in this 
action on the basis of his own stipulation. 
Martineau asserts that he had authorization from the Hammons-
Martineau Partnership to assert the offsets owned by that 
partnership. As evidence for that authorization, Martineau 
produced the partnership agreement. The provision of the 
partnership agreement does not authorize Martineau to assert the 
offsets owned by the partnership and Martineau failed to provide 
any other evidence of the alleged authorization. 
Martineau alleges that this action is based upon an oral 
agreement (Appellant's Brief, p. 1, 17, 25). The complaint 
alleges that the agreement was based on a writing, and the second 
mortgage was acknowledged by Martineau to be written evidence of 
the loan (R. 156). 
Martineau questions whether the court found Martineau in 
contempt in conjunction with Strand/MLK's Motion to Amend the 
Judgment (Appellant's Brief, p. 30-31). There was no finding by 
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the trial court of contempt. The basis of the Amended Judgment 
was a breach of the stipulation embodied in the Order and 
Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The real party in interest requirements of Rule 17(a) 
were satisfied when Nupetco was substituted as party Plaintiff. 
Pursuant to Rule 25(c) , the court was within its discretion to 
allows the action to go forward despite Strand/MLK's assignment of 
their mortgage to Nupetco. Martineau was not prejudiced by the 
assignment, was able to assert his defenses pursuant to Rule 
13(j)f did in fact assert his counterclaims and offsets, and was 
defeated in those assertions as a matter of law. 
2. The Order and Judgment was the embodiment of the 
stipulation of the parties at trial. Pursuant to that 
stipulation, Martineau stipulated to the entry of a personal 
judgment against him, that the mortgage on the Idaho property was 
valid, and that all of his defenses relating to the validity of 
the mortgage were waived, and that Strand/MLK would immediately 
foreclosure on the Idaho property. In direct violation of this 
stipulation, Martineau asserted defenses in the Idaho foreclosure 
action and caused the property to be placed under the protection 
of the bankruptcy court. As a result, the Court exercised 
appropriate discretion in amending the Judgment to remove the 
restriction requiring Strand/MLK to foreclose on the Idaho 
property prior to enforcing the judgment against Martineau. 
3. Martineau did not own the offsets and counterclaim which 
he sought to assert against Strand/MLK and, where there was no 
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material issue of fact alleged, Strand/MLK filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment requesting the court to dismiss counterclaims and 
offsets which Martineau did not own and had no standing to assert. 
Martineau stipulated prior to the hearing on the summary judgment 
motion, that no interest of the parties or the parties themselves 
would be altered before trial. The law precludes an individual 
Martineau from asserting the claims of a partnership as a 
counterclaim or offset against a third party Plaintiff's 
individual claim against Martineau. The stipulation precluded 
Martineau from substituting or adding a party and Martineau 
produced no evidence at the hearing, and no evidence appears in 
the record, of the partnership's agreement that Martineau is 
authorized to assert partnership claims for his own individual 
benefit, and the offsets fail. 
4. It was well within the discretion of the court to add 
Nupetco as a Plaintiff, especially in light of Rules 17(a) and 
25(c), granting the court discretion to substitute parties. 
Martineau has cited no authority for the proposition that it was 
error to allow Nupetco to prosecute this action prior to becoming 
a named party, and this issue is raised Eor the first time on 
appeal and should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
DEFENDANT MARTINEAU'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT AS A VIOLATION OF THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
RULE. 
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A. The Substitution of Nupetco as Plaintiff Satisfies and 
Eliminates the Real Party in Interest Defense, 
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. . 
. . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in 
interest; and such ratification, joinder, and 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action 
had been commenced in the name of the real party in 
interest. 
The purpose of the real party in interest rule was stated by 
the advisory committee: 
[T]he modern function of the rule in its negative aspect 
is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent 
action by the party actually entitled to recover, and 
insure generally that the judgment will have its proper 
effect as res judicata. 
39 F.R.D. 84-85 (1966). The 1966 amendment to Rule 17(a) added 
the last sentence which reflects the general policy that the 
choice of a party at the pleading stage need not be made at the 
risk of final dismissal of the action should it later appear that 
Standard of Proof. 
The trial court's denial of a 60(b) motion, is only 
overturned on appeal when it is shown that the trial judgment 
clearly abused his discretion. "The district court judge is 
vested with considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting 
or denying a motion to set aside a judgment." Kate v. Pierce, 732 
P.2d 92 (Utah 1986). See also, State ex rel. Utah State 
Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1983). 
Likewise, when the trial court amends the pleadings to 
substitute a party, this decision will only be disturbed by a 
showing of ". . . abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988). 
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there had been an error. 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d §1555 (1990). 
The courts have recognized that the purpose of Rule 17(a) is 
to liberalize party rules, and liberal construction will always be 
given to effect that purpose. 3A Moore's Federal Practice If 17.07 
(2d ed. 1948); Kilborn v. Western Sur. Co., 187 F.2d 567 (C.A. 
10th, 1951); Price & Pierce Limited v. Jarka Great Lakes Corp., 37 
F. Supp. 939 (W.D. Mich. 1941). The Utah Supreme Court has 
defined the purpose of Rule 17(a) as follows: 
A defendant has the right to have a cause of action 
prosecuted by the real party in interest to avoid 
further action on the same demand by another and to 
permit the defendant to assert all the defenses or 
counterclaims available against the real owner of the 
cause. Shaw v. Jepsen, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 
(1952). Under the circumstances of this case it is 
clear that the purpose of the rule has been satisfied. 
Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft and Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). Both 
assignor (Strand/MLK) and assignee (Nupetco) were before the trial 
court, asserting one action against Martineau. Martineau has no 
risk of duplicate or inconsistent claims being pursued against him 
and his real party in interest defense fails. 
Martineau retained every claim, defense, and offset he ever 
possessed against Strand despite the assignment of the mortgage to 
Nupetco. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 13(j) states: 
(j) Claims Against Assignee. Except as otherwise 
provided by law as to negotiable instruments and 
assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim which could have been 
asserted against an assignor at the time of or before 
notice of such assignment, may be asserted against his 
assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, 
or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim 
of the assignee. 
18 
See also, Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962). 
Martineau has shown no inability or prejudice in asserting his 
claims and offsets because of the assignment. Martineau did 
present his offsets which were fully considered by the court (R. 
420). 
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 17(a), on April 26, 1989, Judge 
Daniels substituted Nupetco as the party plaintiff. (R. 663-664). 
(See Addendum Exhibit "E") The substitution of Nupetco has ". . . 
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of 
the real party in interest." Rule 17(a). The real party in 
interest defense " . . . should be applied only to cases in which 
substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid 
injustice." 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & 
Procedure, Civil 2d §1555 (1990). Martineau made no showing of 
prejudice or injustice in this action. 
B. Pursuant to Rule 25(c), the Action may Continue in the Name 
of Strand/MLK Despite the Assignment to Nupetco. 
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(c) Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer 
of interest, the action may be continued by or against 
the original party, unless the court upon motion directs 
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be 
substituted in the action or joined with the original 
party. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 
252 P.2d 538, 539 (1953), has recognized this rule to prevent the 
dismissal of an action when the action is assigned while the case 
is pending: 
The answer to any contention that the court lost 
jurisdiction in this suit between Tree and Hess when the 
latter conveyed during the pendency of the action, might 
well be found in Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
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Strand/MLK assigned their cause of action to Nupetco three weeks 
before the trial (R. 489). (See Addendum Exhibit "C") Rule 25(c) 
allows the action to continue in the names of the original parties 
and any judgment reached in the ongoing action accrues to the 
assignee. 
The most significant feature of Rule 25(c) is that 
it does not require that anything be done after an 
interest has been transferred. The action may be 
continued by or against the original party, and the 
judgment will be binding on his successor in interest 
even though he is not named. 
7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d 
§1958 (1986). The court was free to allow this action to 
proceeded in the name of Strand/MLK or to substitute Nupetco as 
plaintiff. Martineau asserted the real party in interest defense 
in both the Idaho (R. 102) and Utah actions (R.54), but when both 
of these motions were denied, Martineau failed to take the 
additional step necessary to resolve his perceived injustice; he 
made no motion to substitute Nupetco as a party. 
Where no motion for substitution or joinder is made, the 
action will continue in the name of the original party, 
and the transferee does not become a party to the 
action. In the event that the transferee has not been 
substituted or joined as an additional party to the 
action, he nonetheless will be bound by an adverse 
judgment, even though not a party, for his rights are no 
better than his transferor's; and similarly if the 
judgment is in favor of the transferor the adjudication 
enures to the benefit of the transferee. Of course, if 
Procedure, designed to continue the litigation with the 
same litigants to a determinative conclusion. Were it 
otherwise, litigation might arrive at stalemate by the 
simple device of a conveyance pendente lite, resulting 
in a series of endless suits. 
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the transferee has been substituted or joined as an 
additional party pursuant to Rule 25(c) he is similarly 
bound by an adverse judgment and benefited by a 
favorable judgment. 
3B Moore's Federal Practice J 25.08 (2d ed. 1948). The court 
acted within its discretion in allowing the action to be continued 
in the name of Strand/MLK and in substituting Nupetco on the 
strength of the assignment of the cause of action. 
C, Defendant Martineau Waived His Right to Claim the Defense of 
Real Party in Interest. 
The real party in interest defense is waived if not timely 
asserted. Assertion of the real party in interest defense: 
. . is for the benefit of Defendant, and should be 
raised in timely fashion or it may be deemed waived. 
See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, 
§ 1554, pages 700-704. 
Audio-Visual Marketing Corp. v. Omni Corp., 545 F.2d 715, 719 
(C.A. 10th 1976). See also, Hefley v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1383 (C.A. 
10th 1982)(The real party in interest defense may be waived if not 
raised in a timely fashion and Defendant who knew facts necessary 
to assert the defense for a year and a half prior to the filing of 
the Complaint waived this defense). The real party in interest 
defense not raised until after trial was waived. See, U.S.F.& G. 
Co. v. Slifkin, 200 F. Supp 563, (N.D. Ala 1961). 
Three months before Strand/MLK filed the complaint and three 
years before Martineau asserted the real party in interest defense 
(R. 100, 108, 115), Strand assigned the second mortgage to Nupetco 
and provided Martineau with constructive knowledge of the 
assignment. In addition, Wayne G. Petty1s Affidavit establishes 
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that he prepared and recorded the Assignment and personally 
notified Leland Martineau by telephone and in person of Nupetco1s 
interest in the subject property (R. 115-116). Martineau has 
presented no evidence to establish that the trial court abused its 
discretion in finding that Martineau waived his real party in 
interest defense. Absent such a showing, the decision of the 
trial court should be upheld. 
D. Defendant Martineau Failed to Establish that the Court 
Abused its Discretion by Allowing the Action to Continue in 
the Name of Strand/MLK. 
Martineau alleges that Strand's assignment of the mortgage to 
Nupetco disqualified Strand as the real party in interest and 
justified a dismissal of this action. This argument fails because 
the action was brought to enforce the underlying obligation 
referred to in the mortgage, not to enforce the mortgage itself. 
An action to enforce the mortgage was brought in Idaho and failed 
because no note existed requiring the repayment of the loan (R. 
205). Strand/MLK owned the claim on the underlying obligation 
until it was assigned to Nupetco on August 12, 1985 (R. 489) , two 
years after the complaint was filed and three weeks before trial. 
Strand/MLK were the real parties in interest when the action was 
initiated and the court appropriately allowed the action to 
continue in the name of Strand/MLK pursuant to Rule 25(c). 
Martineau has failed to establish that the court abused its 
discretion by denying Martineau's Motion, for Relief from the 
Judgment because of an alleged violation of the real party in 
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i n t e r e s t r u l e . Absent such a showing, the appeal must be 
dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN AMENDING 
THE OCTOBER 11, 1985 ORDER AND JUDGMENT TO ALLOW 
PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED AGAINST THE PERSONAL ASSETS OF 
DEFENDANT MARTINEAU. 
A. The Judgment was a Personal Money Judgment, with a Condition 
of Foreclosure Before Seeking Personal Assets, 
Martineau argues that the judgment was never a personal 
judgment against him and that the parties agreed to consider 
whether a deficiency judgment would be granted against Martineau 
at a future time. This is not the case. The Order and Judgment 
is a personal judgment against Martineau. The judgment states in 
pertinent part: 
1. The mortgage attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is 
a valid mortgage given to the Plaintiff, Michael Strand 
by Leland Martineau and Charles Water to secure an 
obligation of $327,989.25 . . . . 
3. The Plaintiffs . . . are required to foreclose 
said mortgage against the property . . . before 
proceeding against the personal assets of the Defendant 
Martineau. 
(R. 50-51) The transcript of the hearing including the 
stipulation confirms that the parties intended that the judgment 
be personal against Martineau. Martineau's attorney stated that 
Strand/MLK were not: 
3 
Standard of Review. 
When enforcing a compromise settlement or stipulation the 
trial court will not be reversed unless it is shown that there was 
an abuse of discretion. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1987); Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 602 (Utah 1982); Bambrouqh 
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
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. . . entitled to a personal judgment against Mr. 
Martineau on this $300,000.00 plus until he foreclosed 
on that second mortgage and until that property is sold. 
And then if there is a deficiency, he'll have a judgment 
against him personally for the deficiency. 
(R. 159) The hearing continued: 
The Court: Well, if that property—if you 
foreclose on that property, I would think that they are 
allowed—if you foreclose, there's a sale, there's a 
deficiency, you get a deficiency judgment. 
Mr. Kipp: Deficiency. They'll have a deficiency 
judgment against whomever are the makers, I guess the 
trustors or the signors of the mortgage. 
The Court: I would think so. I think Leland 
Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley Properties—Mr. 
Caine that's it. That's our understanding. 
(R. 16 8) Martineau stipulated that the Idaho property would be 
sold and the proceeds used towards the judgment before turning to 
his personal assets. The language of the Order and Judgment 
expresses the Court's intent to enter a personal judgment against 
Martineau. 
B. Defendant Martineau Violated the Stipulation; The Court was 
within its Power to Fashion an Appropriate Remedy. 
Martineau violated the Order and Judgment entered on October 
11, 1985 by filing and arguing in the Idaho court that the foreign 
judgment was void because Nupetco lacked capacity and standing, 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the 
statute of limitations for enforcing the mortgage had run, that 
the claim was not being prosecuted by the real party in interest, 
and that Nupetco had failed to obtain jurisdiction over all named 
defendants (R. 99-107, 306). When it became obvious that the 
Idaho Courts would rule that the property must be foreclosed and 
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sold, Martineau caused the property to be placed in bankruptcy (R. 
524). In the Utah action, Martineau filed and argued the Motion 
for Relief from Order and Judgment asserting similar defenses. 
Martineaufs acts made the Order and Judgment unenforceable. In 
determining whether a stipulation can be enforced, when breached 
by one of the parties, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . when the parties failed to perform in accordance 
with their stipulations, the Court was not powerless to 
require them to abide by their agreement. It would 
indeed be a serious reflection upon our system of 
jurisprudence if parties could stipulate an agreement of 
settlement but refuse with impunity from performing. 
Courts are not impotent when one or more parties to a 
stipulation becomes recalcitrant. 
Johnson v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d 
171 (1954). "It is quite well established that a settlement 
agreement may be summarily enforced by motion in the court of the 
original action." Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 
592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979); Millerberq v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 
602 (Utah 1982). 
I t i s commonly held t h a t v i o l a t i o n s of s t i p u l a t i o n s by 
4 p a r t i e s may not be t o l e r a t ed . The California Court of Appeals 
s t a t ed : 
Some c o u r t s hold p a r t i e s in contempt for f l a g r a n t l y 
v i o l a t i n g a s t ipu la t ion and the resu l t ing order . In Montana v. 
Kinman, 430 P.2d 110, 112 (Mont. 1967), the court s t a t ed : 
The fac t s i t u a t i o n as indicated by the t r i a l court in 
i t s comments in the record are such tha t the t r i a l court 
should have found s p e c i f i c a l l y respondents Kinman in 
c o n t e m p t . The t r i a l c o u r t a c t u a l l y made such a 
conclusion as hereinbefore indicated, but concluded tha t 
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Such a stipulation made in open court constitutes "not 
only agreements between the parties, but between them 
and the Court, which the latter is bound to enforce, not 
only for the benefit of the party interested, . . . but 
for the protection of its own honor and dignity." 
[Quoting Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 14 P.2d 523]. 
Cathcart v. Gregory, 45 Cal. App. 2d 179, 113 P.2d 894, 898 
(1941). The same Court also stated: 
The violation of a valid and unrevoked stipulation may 
be redressed on behalf of one who is not himself in 
default by the Court in which it is entered into. . . . 
Plaintiff's refusal to comply with the agreement of 
settlement and the order constitute a breach of his 
obligation. 
Faye v. Fieldman, 128 Cal. App. 2d 319, 275 P.2d 121, 127 (1954). 
The case at bar greatly resembles Royal Resources, Inc. v. 
Gibralter Financial Corp. , 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979). In that 
case, the parties stipulated to a judgment against defendant and 
plaintiff would seek compensation from a third source (federal 
insurance) before going after defendant for payment. The lower 
court ordered that the trial of the unresolved issues of 
defendant's personal liability would be continued without date. 
When the insurance proceeds were not paid to plaintiffs, judgment 
it was an idle gesture. Idle gesture indeed! 
Respondents' actions were a direct contemptuous flouting 
of their own stipulation, of direct court orders, and of 
valid and valuable rights of the [Plaintiff]. As such 
this court cannot and will not ignore its duty to 
correct the error. Therefore, to end this phase of the 
litigation, contempt is found. 
The court is therefore justified in exercising its discretion to 
enforce a judgment and, if necessary, find Defendant in contempt. 
Although the trial court made no finding that Defendant was in 
contempt, it had power to fashion an appropriate remedy. 
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was entered individually against defendant based on the strength 
of the stipulation. The Court stated: 
The judgment against [the corporate defendant] was of 
little or no value except for the possibility of 
compensation that may have been forthcoming from [the 
federal insurance]/ and as it now stands, the judgment 
has no value at all. Also, said judgment was clearly in 
the best interest of [the individual defendants] since 
it deferred the determination of their own liability, 
and in fact it would have absolved them of liability had 
the claim against [the federal insurer] materialized. 
Needless to say, it was highly appropriate for trial 
court to accept the various stipulations of the parties 
and so attempt to resolve the law suit. 
Id. at 796. As in Royal Resources, Martineau's stipulation 
attempted to insulate and minimize personal liability to the 
extent of the value of the real property in Idaho. As a direct 
result of Martineau's actions, Strand/MLK, notwithstanding prompt, 
reasonable effort, consistent with the stipulation and the court's 
judgment, were prevented from obtaining the benefits of the 
stipulation. Strand/MLK were therefore entitled to have the 
provisions of the Order and Judgment amended to allow Strand/MLK 
to pursue Martineau personally under the terms of the Order and 
Judgment. 
C. The Utah Court Lacks Jurisdiction over the Idaho Property; 
the Court has Discretion to Fashion a Remedy within its 
Jurisdiction. 
The Judgment and Order personally bound Martineau, but was 
not binding upon the Idaho real property securing the mortgage. 
The Court had in personam jurisdiction over Martineau, but the 
Idaho real property, and any foreclosure action on that property, 
were outside the court's jurisdiction. In Hammond v. Wall, 51 
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Utah 464, 171 P. 148 (1918), the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
Utah courts do not have jurisdiction to require foreclosure of 
Idaho land. The Supreme Court stated: 
"Lands lying in one state cannot be reached or sold 
under order, license, or decree of a court entered in a 
different state. The jurisdiction is local, the lex 
loci rei sitae governs." [quoting Rorer on Judicial 
Sales, § 58] 
Id. at 151. The Court continued and stated that the Utah trial 
court: 
. . . was powerless to foreclose the mortgage on lands 
lying in Idaho and to order the sheriff of Wasatch 
County to sell those lands and to apply the proceeds in 
satisfaction of the mortgage. The law clothed the 
sheriff with no such power and the Court was powerless 
to invest him therewith. The District Court had 
jurisdiction to grant the relief respecting the 
reaffirmation of the deed and mortgage, since to that 
extent the action was merely in personam and operated 
only on the persons interest in the transactions and in 
the mortgage premises. 
Id. 
Despite the Utah court's lack of jurisdiction over the Idaho 
property, the amendment to the judgment did not violate the one 
action rule. The action to collect on the underlying obligation 
is procedural and does not bar a collection action in another 
state on the underlying debt. Martin v. Midgett, 100 Az. 284, 413 
P.2d 754 (1966);5 Maxwell v. Ricks, 294 F. 255 (9th Cir. 1923);6 
"We agree that the provisions of [the] California [one 
action rule] are procedural only and do not bar plaintiff from 
recovery in this action [on the notes] filed in . . . Arizona." 
413 P.2d at 757. 
" . . . the enforcement of the payment of the debt 
evidenced by the notes is but a remedy, limited, as already said, 
in an action brought in the courts of California, but not so 
united with the common-law right as to preclude the maintenance of 
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Mantle v. Dabney, 47 Wash. 394, 92 P. 134 (1907); Felton v. West, 
Q 
102 Cal. 266, 36 P. 676 (1894). In the case at bar, the parties' 
stipulated to foreclose the Idaho property and attribute the 
proceeds to satisfy Martineau1s personal judgment. Strand/MLK, 
and their assignee Nupetco, consistent with the stipulation, 
sought foreclosure of the property in Idaho. Defendant, contrary 
to the stipulation, interfered with the foreclosure action. 
Consequently, the court utilized its power to fashion a remedy to 
provide Plaintiffs the benefit of the stipulation and the court's 
judgment. Removing the foreclosure requirement does not violate 
the one action rule. 
POINT III 
THE LAW WILL NOT ENFORCE OFFSETS 
OWNED BY ENTITIES NOT PARTIES TO THE ACTION. 
A. Summary Judgment was Properly Entered Because Defendant 
Martineau may not Assert Claims or Offsets not Owned by Him. 
The order granting summary judgment states: 
. . . because Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his 
interest in the alleged claims and offsets asserted in 
this action to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is 
an action on the debt in the federal court [of Washington], if the 
necessary diversity of citizenship exists." 294 F. at 257. 
7 
"We do not th ink t h i s s t a t u t e can have the e f f e c t of 
making a f o r e c l o s u r e upon t h e s e c u r i t y in C a l i f o r n i a a 
p re requ is i t e to an action upon the note in t h i s s t a t e . " 92 P. a t 
134. 
g 
"[The one action rule] only refers to actions for the 
recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage upon property situated in 
the state of California. The context clearly evidences that fact. 
All the provisions of the section entirely negative the idea of 
any other construction. We cannot assume that the authors of this 
legislation attempted to establish a procedure for the foreclosure 
of mortgages upon realty situated in other states." 36 P. at 667. 
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unable to assert said claims and offsets against the 
personal judgment entered against himf and the Court 
therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Nupetco 
Associates. 
(R. 665). This summary judgment was in response to Martineau1s 
offsets and claims against Strand/MLK. In his Affidavit of 
Claimed Offsets (R. 420-425) Martineau set forth three classes of 
offsets: 
a. Alleged accounting fees incurred by Strand and 
Strand-related entities. 
b. Alleged accounting services for Magic Valley 
Properties, a partnership in which Martineau is a 
partner and claims Strand is a partner. 
c. The judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court in favor of David Hammons and against Plaintiffs 
which has been assigned by David W. Hammons to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership. 
Martineau implied in his Affidavit that he owned the offsets 
claimed. However, nowhere in Martineau's Affidavit or the record 
did he expressly indicate that he personally owned these offsets 
or that he had standing to assert them against Strand/MLK. On the 
contrary, undisputed evidence presented to the trial court 
established that Martineau did not personally own any of the 
asserted offsets and claims, but they were owned by Martineau and 
Company and the Hammons-Martineau Partnership (R. 698, p. 19, 34-
35). 
Martineau's Affidavit discloses that he seeks to offset one-
half of the alleged accounting services for Magic Valley 
Properties, a partnership, (R. 421, paragraphs 4 and 5) and also 
offset the accounting fees incurred by Strand and Strand-related 
entities (paragraph 3). Martineau failed to disclose in his 
Affidavit that the services performed for Strand, the Strand 
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related entities, and Magic Valley Properties were services 
performed by Martineau and Company, a partnership in which 
Martineau is a partner. Strand/MLK provided the trial court with 
a list of the alleged accounting fees set forth in Martineau1 s 
Affidavit complete with corresponding bills from Martineau and 
Company, a partnership (R. 491-502). To establish that Martineau 
and Company was a partnership, a copy of the Application to 
Transact Business Under an Assumed Name, dated August 8, 1986, 
filed with the State of Utah was presented to the court (R. 503). 
This document indicated that Martineau and Mark F. Jensen were the 
persons who own and transact business in the name of Martineau and 
Company. Martineau admits that he assigned all of these offsets 
to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership (Appellant's Brief, p. 32). 
Martineau claims in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit (R. 420) 
that he rendered services to Strand-related entities in the amount 
of $163,471.00 plus interest (paragraph 3). He also claims in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Affidavit, that he rendered $399,322.24 
of services for and in behalf of Magic Valley Properties and that 
Mike Strand is a one-half owner of Magic Valley Properties, and 
therefore, Strand is liable for one-half of the total value of the 
services rendered or $199,661.12, plus interest for a total of 
$303,473.55. But Martineau has no standing to assert those 
claims. All the accounting services for both Magic Valley 
Properties and the alleged Strand-related entities were performed 
by Martineau and Company. Both Martineau and Company and Magic 
Valley Properties are partnerships in which Martineau is a 
31 
partner, but these entities are not parties to this action. 
Individual partners are not entitled to utilize partnership assets 
for their own individual use. 
The corpus of the assets is partnership property, and 
neither partner separately has anything in that corpus; 
the interest of each is only his share of what remains 
after debts are paid and all accounts are settled. The 
rule rests upon the equities of the partners as between 
each other, since each partner is entitled to regard 
partnership property as held for his indemnity as 
against partnership debts, and as security for the 
ultimate balance which may be due him for his own share 
of the partnership assets. [Emphasis added]. 
Gaynes v. Conn, 185 Kan. 655, 347 P.2d 458, 464 (1959). No 
partner is entitled to utilize partnership property individually 
until the debts of the partnership are settled. Utah Code 
Annotated § 48-1-37 (1953). The partnership assets are separate 
and distinct from the estate of the individual partners. 
. . . While a partnership has no existence separate and 
apart from the members which compose it, it is 
nevertheless an entity as to all matters germane to its 
interest or affairs. It has its own capital, its own 
assets and liabilities. In other words, the partnership 
estate is separate and distinct from the individual 
estates of its members. [Emphasis added]. 
Id. at 465. Holding property as a tenant in partnership is quite 
different from personal ownership. Matter of Estate of Palmer, 
708 P.2d 242, 248-49 (Mont. 1985). An individual partner has no 
specific personal ownership in partnership property. Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-1-21 and § 48-1-22. Rowby v. Day, 635 P.2d 611, 614 
(Okla. 1981). The partners have only an equitable claim to 
partnership property, but the legal title remains in the 
partnership. Clark v. Fiedler, 44 Cal. App. 2d 838, 113 P.2d 275, 
281 (1941). 
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Magic Valley Properties and Martineau and Company are not 
parties to this action and Martineau is not personally entitled to 
utilize partnership assets for his own personal benefit. Only 
upon dissolution of the partnerships and after satisfaction of the 
claims of creditors can partnership assets be distributed 
individually to the named partners. Therefore/ Martineau has no 
valid offset against the judgment of Nupetco in this matter. 
Martineau alleges that he had consent from the Hammons-
Martineau partnership to assert the claims. Martineau argues that 
the terms of the partnership agreement are sufficient to establish 
that there was an agreement between the partners pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann § 48-1-22. The record does not contain any evidence that 
such an agreement exists. The record does not contain any 
statement from the partners of the Hammons-Martineau Partnership 
indicating that there was an agreement for the use of the assets 
of the partnership by Martineau, and no such agreement may be 
assumed. The partnership agreement states that the partnership 
business is to ". . . collect!] any assets of Michael W. Strand or 
related entities." (R. 481). This statement makes no reference to 
allowing Martineau to personally claim the offset belonging to the 
partnership in this action. Even if the partnership agreement did 
authorize Martineau to personally assert the assets of the 
partnership for his personal gainf the utilization of these 
offsets does not further the partnership purpose, which is to 
operate "Magic Valley Properties and collect any assets of Michael 
W. Strand or related entities." The use of these offsets will in 
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no way foster the purpose of the partnership nor will the 
successful use of the offsets constitute a collection of any asset 
of Michael W. Strand. In fact, the use of these offsets will 
reduce the value of the partnership by depleting its assets with 
no gain. Therefore, the Summary Judgment must be upheld because 
only the Hammons-Martineau Partnership may assert such ownership 
control over partnership asset and the use of these assets does 
not further the purposes of the partnership. The Hammons-
Martineau Partnership cannot assert these offsets because it is 
not a party. 
As a matter of law, Strand/MLK1s obligation to a partnership 
of which Martineau is a member may not offset the individual 
obligation of Martineau. 
"A defendant in an action brought against him 
individually upon a demand for the payment of which he 
is individually liable can not, without showing some 
equitable reason for being allowed so to do, set off 
against the plaintiff's claim a debt due by the latter 
to a partnership of which defendant is or has been a 
member." Bishop v. Mathews & Co., 109 Ga. 790, 35 S.E. 
161. 
Security Management Company, Inc. v. King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 208 
S.E.2d 576, 578 (1974). See also, White v. Jackson, 252 S.C. 274, 
166 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1969)("In an action against one partner for a 
debt by him, a debt due to his firm cannot be the basis of a 
setoff or counterclaim."); Powell v. Downing, 225 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 
App. 1950) ("A partner cannot offset an indebtedness to the 
partnership against an indebtedness of the individual partner."). 
Martineau argues that even if he were not the owner of the 
offsets, that the Summary Judgment was wrongfully entered because 
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he was not given the opportunity to join the proper p a r t i e s . This 
argument f a i l s for several reasons. F i r s t , the pa r t i e s s t ipu la ted 
not to subs t i t u t e pa r t i e s or t ransfer i n t e r e s t s pr ior to t r i a l and 
t h e r e f o r e , no o ther p a r t i e s could have been brought in to the 
a c t i o n (R. 697) . Second, no motion has been made seeking to 
s u b s t i t u t e or jo in a p a r t y . Mar t ineau ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t he 
r e p r e s e n t e d to the cour t that the par tnerships were wil l ing to 
become pa r t i e s to the action i s unsubstantiated in the record. By 
t h e same t o k e n , M a r t i n e a u a s s e r t s t h a t he cou ld o b t a i n 
d o c u m e n t a t i o n n e c e s s a r y to r a t i f y M a r t i n e a u ' s use of the 
p a r t n e r s h i p s ' c l a i m s , but no such documentation appears in the 
r e c o r d . Martineau s t i p u l a t e d tha t no i n t e r e s t s of the pa r t i e s 
would be a l t e r e d dur ing the pendency of t h i s a c t i o n , and a 
subs t i tu t ion or assignment i s not ava i l ab le . 
B. Offse ts and Counterclaims may not be Asserted Unless there 
Exists Mutuality of Obligation Between the P a r t i e s . 
M a r t i n e a u may not a s s e r t the Hammons judgment a g a i n s t 
Strand/MLK because t h e r e i s no mutuality of obl igat ion between 
Strand/MLK and the Hammons judgment. In order for an offset to be 
va l id , there must be mutuality between the pa r t i e s and the offset 
c la im. In 80 C . J . S . Setoff and Counterclaim § 4 8 ( a ) ( 2 ) , i t 
s t a t e s : 
I t i s a broad gene ra l r u l e of p r a c t i c a l l y universa l 
appl icat ion tha t . . . in order to warrant a setoff , 
the demands must be mutual and subsis t ing between the 
same p a r t i e s and furthermore must be due in the same 
capacity or r i g h t , and there must be mutuality as to the 
qual i ty of the r i g h t . In order to be mutual, the cross 
demand s e t up o r d i n a r i l y must be shown to belong 
i n d i v i d u a l l y to the defendan t , with a corresponding 
-*c; 
right to sue for them in his individual name, and 
defendant, as a general rule, cannot setoff a demand on 
which he is not entitled to sue in his own name. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The mutuality requirement has also been defined in 20 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Counterclaim, Recoupment, Offset, § 74 as follows: 
Generally, to warrant an offset or counterclaim in an 
action, the demands must be mutual, that is, the offset 
or counterclaim in the action must be between the same 
parties in the same capacity or right, and there must be 
mutuality as to the quality of the right. The setoff or 
counterclaim must be such a demand that defendant, in 
his own name, or in the names of defendant sued, without 
bringing in the name of a stranger to the suit, may 
maintain an action of debtor on it against the party, or 
all parties suing, as the case may be. . . . Negatively 
stated, debts accruing in different rights cannot be 
setoff against each other. A test is that the 
indebtedness for which the action is brought must be 
such that if plaintiff were sued by defendant on the 
setoff claimed, he could claim his cause of action in 
that suit as offset. [Emphasis added]. 
See also; First Security Bank of Utah v. Utah Turkey Growers, 
Inc., 610 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980); Cook v. Jones, 115 Utah 536, 206 
P.2d 630 (1949); Wood v. Akridge, 84 Utah 468, 36 P.2d 804 (1934). 
There is no mutuality of obligation between Strand/MLK and 
the Hammons judgment in this action. The Hammons-Martineau 
partnership is not a party to this action and Martineau is not 
personally entitled to assert the judgment owned by the 
partnership in his own individual name against Strand/MLK. 
Martineau individually would clearly not be entitled to file an 
action to enforce the Hammons judgment in his own name, and 
therefore, the offset fails. 
C. Defendant Martineau as Assignor may not Utilize any Claims 
or Offsets which He has Assigned to Another. 
The concept that the assignor may not utilize any claim that 
he has assigned for his own benefit is set forth in two companion 
cases of the Utah Supreme Court, Taylor v. Barker , 70 Utah 534, 
262 P. 266 (1927), and Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515 
(1929). In these cases, an automobile accident occurred between 
the vehicles driven by Taylor and Waddoups. Waddoups assigned his 
claim against Taylor to Moss, a passenger in the Waddoups vehicle. 
Moss sued Taylor for the damages to the Waddoups vehicle and 
personal injuries to Moss. Before the trial on the Moss v. Taylor 
action, Taylor brought an action against Waddoups for property 
damage to Taylor's vehicle. This case was tried and judgment was 
awarded to Taylor. Waddoups appealed this judgment. Taylor 
requested that the court in Moss v. Taylor instruct the jury that 
Moss could not recover any damages in light of the judgment in 
Taylor v. Waddoups. The court in Moss v. Taylor refused to do 
this, and judgment was entered in favor of Moss. Similar to the 
actions of Taylor, Waddoups sought to amend his answer in the 
Taylor v. Waddoups, which was on appeal for a trial de novo before 
the District Court, to allege the judgment on the same facts 
against Taylor in Moss v. Taylor. Waddoups1 supplemental answer 
requested judgment and that the proceedings in Taylor v. Waddoups 
be stayed until the Moss v. Taylor action could be completed. The 
trial court stayed all further proceedings on Taylor v. Waddoups 
during the pendency of the Moss v. Taylor action. Taylor appealed 
the order staying the proceedings in Taylor v. Waddoups, and the 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and vacated the stay. 
Like Martineau in the case at bar, Waddoups sought to offset 
and utilize the claims he had assigned to Moss to offset or 
nullify Taylor's claim against him. In his opinion for the 
Supreme Court, Justice Hansen stated that he had: 
. made a somewhat extended search to find 
authority in support of the contention that Waddoups may 
plead the Moss judgment against Taylor as a defense to 
the action of Taylor v. Waddoups, but [had] been unable 
to find any such authority, and the citations of counsel 
for respondent do not support such contention. 
Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262 P. 266, 268 (1927). The 
Supreme Court also stated: 
Clearly, after Waddoups assigned his claim to the 
Plaintiff in this action, there ceased to be a claim 
existing in his favor against Taylor for the injury to 
the Waddoups car. After the assignment, Waddoups could 
not sue or counterclaim upon the assigned claim unless 
the same was reassigned to him. 
Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 P. 515, 520 (1929). 
The effect of Strand/MLK's assignment of the cause of action 
and judgment to Nupetco and Martineau's assignment of all his 
right, title, and interest in the counterclaim and offsets to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership, have divided this case into two 
separate and distinct actions. Just as Waddoups, as a defendant, 
attempted to assert the claim which he had assigned to Moss as a 
defense against Taylor's claim, so Martineau attempted to assert a 
claim which he assigned to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership to 
offset the judgment against him held by Nupetco. Because Waddoups 
assigned his claim against Taylor to Moss, Waddoups had no 
counterclaim or offset which he could assert in an action by 
Taylor for Waddoups' liability in the accident. Likewise, 
Martineau has no claim or offset which he ^ n ^ow isser- against 
Nupetco Neither Waddoups i lor Ma i t i i :ie . i -
 : -, s : -;
r
 -  ' eir 
l i a b i l i t y , thus keeping them as defendants -he separate 
actions. 
W h e n Strand,/ ' MLK assigned their cause of action against 
Martineau to N u p e t c o Strand/MLK •-*.; . >nqer ^ad any interest ;r 
cont rol ov er ti le ca'. * : • : v .. • i Straa I v -
assignment, however, :i<; .w* relieve Strand personal liability 
which is alleged , • • .- counterclaim, Strand/MLK therefore do not 
h i ' • - a . , - , - t j- = •>.->t 
a g a i n s t M a r t i n e a u \ > \ i . s a s s i g n e e . The same is tr i i a for 
Martinea: 1 assignment of all his ^icr-- • - Le aiid interest in 
c 1 a i in s ag a i i: 1 s t S t r . ~ to the Hammon s -Mar t i neau Partnership: 
the assignments eliminate any claim, or offset Martineau had 
personally against Strand/MLK or their assignee. Martineau1 s 
assignment, however, :: : no*- relieve him of his personal liability 
on the judgment. The Partnership now owns the claim against 
Strand/MLK personally and Martineau r e t a i n s 1 o c ] a i m o = - - -1 
whicn ° can assert against Strand/MLK. 
These two separate actions may be described as the main 
action of Nupetco v. Martineau and the < ::< :)i intei:cI a i m of Hammoi 1 s-
Martineau v. Michael Strand and MLK Investments, rhe respective 
assignees have no claims against. - .-* -,r -.- assignee, b\:+ have 
cl. =iiiTis i q -:i 1.1 " 'hi-* c»c i q i 11 /-i I pa > ' hei r I -, . > -
These claims are distinct, and while they may be tried together, 
there can be no claims asserted which have previously been 
assigned by the party seeking to assert them. 
D. An Assigned Claim or Offset Must Exist and Belong to the 
Defendant Martineau when the Action is Filed or the Claim or 
Offset may not be Asserted. 
Martineau cannot assert the Hammons judgment against 
Strand/MLK because it did not exist when this action was filed and 
was not a claim belonging to Martineau when the action was filed. 
In order for Martineau to utilize an offset against Strand/MLK in 
this matter, the offset must have existed at the time this matter 
was originally filed. Strand/MLK filed this action on August 2, 
1983. The Hammons judgment which Martineau claims as an offset 
was not entered against Strand until July 30, 1986, was then 
vacated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Case No. 880250-CA (R. 
689-693), and then reentered on August 18, 1989. Martineau had no 
interest in the Hammons judgment until the assignment of the 
judgment to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership occurred on 
September 25, 1986. (R. 488) The Hammons judgment and the 
assignment to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership occurred 
subsequent to Strand/MLK filing of this action. 
. . .The general rule is that a setoff or counterclaim 
must not only be in existence, but be in existence in 
favor of the defendant interposing it, at the time the 
action against him was commenced; he cannot purchase it 
afterward,and then set it up. . . . To permit a claim 
existing before but acquired after the commencement of 
the action to be interposed as a counterclaim would be a 
departure from the rule by which actions are to be 
determined according to the rights of parties as they 
exist at the time the actions are commenced. It would 
also encourage barratry, a practice which receives no 
favor from the courts. The law never intended to permit 
a defendant, after an action had been commenced against 
him, to buy up, for purposes of litigation and defense, 
doubtful or other claims against the plaintiff, and then 
interpose them to defeat in whole or in part a demand 
against which the defendant had no defense at the time 
the suit was brought. [Emphasis added], 
2 0 AM . J u r . 2 1 Counterclaims , Recoupment, Offset, # 1 " l ' ? ' l c-c ) . 
See also, Pioneer Investment Corp. v. Cassler & Company, -f)8 r. 2d 
803 (Wyo. 1965) . 
B e c a u s e Martineau had no c la im in the Hammons judgment, or 
i t s u n d e r l y i n g c l a i m , a t t h e t i m e t i n i ' - . i - r . vas i n i t i a t e d , 
M a i I.J ir ieai i rn.iv ze t h i s j . ' - f f s e t In t h i s 
action. 
E. Defendant Martineau may not Assert a Claim or Offset which 
Arose after Plaintiffs Strand/MLK's Cause of Action was 
Assigned to Nupetco. 
'' *i r * > < "* ^  " ~ i -2 -> -1 - - * i o ^ ' 
against Strind/MLK because . - arose after Strand/MLK's ^ause 
action was assigned to Nupetco. Martineau is not entitled to 
uti1ize any offsets subsequently acquired against assignor after 
Martineau had notice that Strand/MLK had assigned the cause of 
f . ^, idgment no Nupetco. At the very latest, Martineau 
personalis , ind his a^ornev,
 r e c ei Ved notice of Strand/ MLK' s 
assignment r.o Nupetco )^ about March 20, 1986, the date when 
en -r m e iaano court mailed ilotice ~ - \'.\ oarties that 
Nupe:-:' . = ; assignee, M 1 ed the October * >< > Or ler and 
Judgment i ^  Idno :: r docketing as a foreign judgment (R. SOB-
the assignment prior trn the Hammons idgment and prior to the 
assignment of the Hammons judgment to the Hammons-Martineau 
Partnership (assigned September 25, 1986f R. 481-488). 
Martineau is not eligible to utilize the Hammons judgment as 
a setoff against Nupetco, because Martineau's interest in said 
judgment was acquired after he received notice of the assignment 
from Strand/MLK to Nupetco. 
. . . a claim arising in favor of defendant against an 
assignor subsequent to the assignment or notice thereof 
cannot be setoff or counterclaimed against the claim of 
the assignee, at least where defendant's claim arises 
under an independent contract not connected with the 
contract giving rise to the assigned cause of action. 
20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Offset § 89 (1965). 
In Ropes, Inc. v. Rubinstein, 4 Wash. 2d 380, 104 P.2d 329 (1940), 
the court stated that the defendant may not: 
. . . after receiving such notice [of assignment] 
acquire new obligations of the assignor and offset 
them to the prejudice of the assignee. 
The assignment of the Hammons judgment to the Hammons-
Martineau Partnership occurred after Martineau received notice of 
the assignment from Strand/MLK to Nupetco and Martineau is 
therefore not entitled to utilize this claim to offset Nupetco's 
judgment. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT APPROPRIATELY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN SUBSTITUTING NUPETCO AS PLAINTIFF. 
It was well within the discretion of the court to substitute 
Nupetco as a party, especially in light of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 17(a) which authorizes the court to substitute parties 
to bring about final judgments. Martineau does not cite any 
a u t h o r I t y f o i : h i • 3 p i : o p o s 11 i o i : 11: 1 a t j o i 1 i n : j N i 1 p e t c c a s e r r o i: ,  11 1 d 
the provisions of Rules 17(a) and 25(c) substantiate the court 1s 
vast discretion in procedural matters. 
Ii i additioi 1, Mar tineau argues * . $ 1 *«r :• appeal 
that i t \ /as inappropriate for the -^j'-* > * . , -•* .* r > . $ 
representing Strand/MLK and Nupetco L an m tneir p r o s e c u t £ o n 
of the claim against Martineau " " . atters n^f raised at the 
trial court level will not be considered fav *nis Cour" >.n appealf 
p a r t :i c i 11 a i: 1 } w h e i I 11 i • a p r o fa 1 e m * : ; • • - " 
Ma s c a r o v. D a v i s , 4, -.„.i -> . <i « w (Utah 1987) Martineau f s 
claim that the cour' -*--,; • *: ^ *, ^ s;-and/MLK and Nupetco 
repress i - .+ insi ippor t 2d a n :! i s 
contrary t; tr.^  :t^: Rules rf 'ivi, Procedure, and the inherent 
discretion of the court. 
CONCLUSION 
A cause of action to enforce the second mortgage was filed in 
Idaho by Strand/MLK but dismissed because no promissory note had 
been executed embodying the obligation of Martineau to strand/MLK. 
As a result of Kh LS dismissal, ^trand/MLK -•._-•.! t-his action on the 
underlyinq debt evidenced by the second mortgage. Three weeks 
b e f o r e t r i a l , S trand/M: :' iss ign* : - • - - - " 
Nupetco, During the course ^f ^he « ; -. *a ;i'iea- stipulated 
the validity of the mortgage and waived his defenses against the 
m o r t g a g e , 0 n .1 } t!: :i i: o I l g h M a r t i n e a u ' s s 11 p i • . 11 i e s e c o n d 
mortgage foreclosure become an issue. 
Martineau argues that the assignment of the mortgage 
prejudiced his ability to assert offsets and defenses in this 
matter. However, Martineau does not disclose what defenses or 
offsets he was precluded from asserting. He claims that Nupetco 
is not the real party in interest, but Nupetco has been 
substituted pursuant to the rules. When Nupetco sought to 
foreclose on the Idaho mortgage, Martineau asserted defenses, 
contrary to the stipulation, to block the foreclosure. In 
frustration, Nupetco petitioned the court to amend the judgment to 
eliminate the requirement of foreclosing on the Idaho property. 
The court granted the amendment, but gave Martineau the 
opportunity to assert his offsets. 
Martineau, however, did not own these offsets. Martineau's 
affidavit and the documents produced by Strand/MLK at the hearing 
conclusively established that all accounting services asserted by 
Martineau were performed by Martineau and Company and all the 
offsets were owned by the Hammons-Martineau Partnership. The 
record contains no evidence that Martineau and Company or the 
Hammons-Martineau partnership authorized Martineau to assert these 
claims as personal offsets against Strand/MLK1s judgment. Without 
such authorization, Martineau cannot utilize these offsets and the 
offsets fail. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion and utilized the 




Respectfully submitted this .y7/? day ot-'February, 1990, 
l/Z4/fo 
(IpttC. Petty^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify ;. r.v . caused to be hand delive1"0^ a *-viio and 
correct copy or *:he foregoing to John c. Green and Kim M Li ihnf 
GU S TIN , G R E E N :' r^ ,;t L & LIA PIS , 4 8 P c • • \ 1 : • 3 f f i c e P1 a c e # 3 0 0 (l S a 1 t 















FA «9 l 
CO « 
be"? 
John T. Caine of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 393-5367 
AUG I 4 » N i « 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and 




LELAND A. MARTINEAU, 
CHARLES WATERS, MAGIC 
VALLEY MOTORS, INC., 





Civil No. CS35fi80 
Come now the plaintiffs above named by and through their 
attorney, Johi I ! Caine, and for their cause of action against 
the above named defendants, complain and allege as follows: 
1. rhat plaintiffs are residents of Davis County, State 
of Utah. That defendant, Martineau, is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah; defendant, Waters, is a resident of the 
State of Idaho; defendant, Magic Valley Properties, is a 
partnership consisting of Martineau and Waters; defendant, Magic 
Valley Motors, Inc., is an Idaho corporation in the business of 
selling ai 11:omobi 1 es . That the agreement that serves as the 
basis for this action was entered into in the State of Utah, and 




and the parties hereto, and the action exceeds $5,000 exclusive 
of costs, therefore, this court is a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
2. That on or about November 5, 1979, plaintiffs entered 
into a written agreement with the defendants, Martineau and 
Waters, wherein plaintiffs would loan monies to the defendants 
to enable them to operate their business, Magic Valley Motors. 
A copy of a written agreement is attached hereto and marked as 
Exhibit !,AM, and by this reference, makes same a part hereof. 
Plaintiff further alleges that he signed this agreement without 
the deleted paragraphs, and that the original is in the possession] 
of the defendant, Martineau. 
3. That in accordance with the above referenced agreement, 
the plaintiffs loaned in excess of $427,989.25, with interest 
thereon at 15%. 
4. That numerous demands have been made by plaintiffs for 
repayment of said loan and defendants have refused to repay any 
amounts. 
5. That defendants1 actions constitute a breach of 
contract and plaintiffs are entitled to damages for said breach 
in the total amount of the loan plus 157o interest, from November 
5, 1979, to the present. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 5 above 
herein, and by this reference, makes same a part hereof. 
7. That defendants1 conduct above described has unjustly 
-3-
enriched them to the detriment of and at the expense of the 
plaintiffs in an amount in excess of $427,989.25. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 7 above 
herein, and by this reference, makes same a part hereof. 
9. That defendants1 actions constitute an unlawful 
conversion of plaintiffs' property to their own use to the 
detriment of the plaintiffs, and that said conversion is willful, 
wanton and deliberate, and is in the amount of $427,989.25 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. For the amount of $427,989.25 and any excesses to be 
proven at time of trial. 
2. For the amount of 157o interest on the amount owed from 
November 5, 1979 to present. 
3. For attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
4. For such other and further relief as the court may 
deem just and proper interne premises 
DATED this^77U2y of July, 1983. 
MICHAEL W. STRAND, Plaintiff 





LELAND MARTINEAU, of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County 
State of Utah, and CHARLES WATERS, and MAGIC VALLEY PROPERTY, 
a partnership comprised of the aforementioned individuals, of 
Burley, County of Caaala, State of Idaho, mortgagors, hereby 
MORTGAGE to MICHAEL W. STRAND and LOIS STRANO, mortgagees 
of Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah for the aum of 
TEN ($10,00) DOLLARS the following deaerlbed tract of land in 
Burley, County of Cassia, State of Idahot 
Lots 18, 19, and 20 Block 3, Johnaon'e Subdivision 
,to the City of Burley, County of Caaala, State of Idaho 
This Second, Mortage is given to secure the indebtness 
between the parties in varying amounts, but presently in excess 
of >200,000.00. 
The mortgagors agree to pay all taxes and asseaaments on 
aaid premises and a reasonable attorney1* fee in case of foreclosure. 




~^*r* pa retire ftr» * 
Matt 
p*>.\y*ffX "B" 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss« 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On thin LCth day of June, Ifffu*, personally appeared before 
ne Loland A. Martlneeu, the signer of the within instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to ne that he executed the sane. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 ^ 1 ^ . 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utsh 
My Commission Expires: 
STATS OF Um& 
COUNTY OF £A£S£A 
0 n
 *«« IC&K- day of June, 1960, personally appeared before 
me Charles Waters, the signer of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same* 
Notary Public 
•I* 
My Commission Expires\ Jr* *f\ >€> •• » r^ i j f 
W ^ 4i. &3i 
STATE OP UJAH ^j^f^T^2 







the /&*> day of June, I960, personroTy appeared before 
m*JLBLAhl& A- /yy^rWg^i e partner in Magic Valley fto^xftlpr* 
who duly acknowledged to mo that he exeeuted the same* 
notary ruoiic * *>
 A , 
^ Residing ets ^ U < ^ ^ f c c £«M-> 
My Commission Expires; 
•sfe% V7*/ 
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM IN LITIGATION 
We, Michael W. Strand and MLK Investments, individually and 
jomtly. of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, in consideration of good 
dnd xaluable consideration to us in hand paid, the receipt whereof is 
hereby aclnowledged, hereby assigns to Nupetco Associates all the 
right, title and interest belonging to them in and to certain claims 
now m litigation in Case No. C83-5680 of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Dated this /<??&-' day of August, 1985. 
Michael W. Strand 
?H^A ^ ^ * > ^ ^ / T ^ X . . 
MLK Investments 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Afrf—day of August, 1985. 
My Commission Expires: Jfa<*>t«Jlf~Ob 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
EXHIBIT "C" feMiT "C" 
John T. Caine #0536 
Richards, Caine & Richards 
2568 S. Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Phone (801) 399-4191 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS, 
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY 
PROPERTIES, a partnership. : 
Defendants. ; 
: AMENDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
: AGAINST LELAND A. MARTINEAU 
: Civil No. C83-5680 
: Judge Scott Daniels 
Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
before the Honorable Judge Scott Daniels on April 22, 1988 at the 
hour of 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff having been represented by John T. 
Caine and Ralph C. Petty, Defendant Leland A. Martineau having 
been represented by John C. Green, the Court having reviewed the 
memoranda and affidavits submitted by the parties, having 
reviewed the files and records herein, having received the oral 
arguments of Counsel, having found that there are no material 
issues of fact, that Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his 
rKH!BIT "»"" 
$7 rz $57*3CT C8U5T 
"! ;..«d Jcdiciai District 
APR 2 6 1989 
/ SALT LAI$E COUNlV 
By i ^^^QL i^—- -
alleged interest in the claims and offsets asserted herein to 
another entity, and for good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that because 
Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his interest in the 
alleged claims and offsets asserted in this action to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is unable to assert said claims 
and offsets against the personal judgment entered against him, 
and the Court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff Nupetco Associates. All other claims Plaintiff Nupetco 
Associates may have against the Defendant Leland A. Martineau and 
Defendant Leland A. Martineau may have against Plaintiff Nupetco 
Associates or its assignor, Michael Strand, are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order constitutes a final 
order from which appeal may be taken. 
DATED this C 2 ^ day of April, 1989. 
By the Court: 
Scott Daniels, Judge 
AptJfcnted a s t o Form: 
/ / 
John C. Green 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green, 
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this /(L day of April, 1989^ 
Ms//. //> 
John T. Caine #0536 
Richards, Caine & Richards 
2568 S. Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Phone (801) 399-4191 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-6686 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK j 
INVESTMENTS, a partnership, : 
Plaintiff, 
v • * 
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES : WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS, 
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY : 
PROPERTIES, a partnership. : 
Defendants. : 
: ORDER SUBSTITUTING 
: PARTIES 
Civil No. C83-5680 
: Judge Scott Daniels 
The above-entitled Court, having reviewed the files and 
records herein, having reviewed the Assignment of Plaintiff's 
interest in the above-entitled matter to Nupetco Associates, 
having reviewed the Stipulation of the parties before Judge 
Moffat at the previously scheduled trial date, having received 
the oral representations of the parties at the October 21 hearing 
and of its own motion, and for good cause appearing, therefore: 
EXHIBIT we 
¥V Z? SSSTSICT CSUCT 
Ti..;c Judicial District 
APR 2 6 1989 
S A L T L ^ E C G U ; 
Oepi'iy Ctertc 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJDUGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff 
Michael Strand and MLK Investments be substituted by Nupetco 
Associates, a Utah limited partnership, as Plaintiff. 
DATED this ^ C ^ day of April, 1989. 
By the Court: 
Scott Daniels, Judge 
Jphr/C. Green 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green, 
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this ((J day of April, 1989. 
u^AXi^hL^ t 
